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The Big Demonstration 
- A study of transborder political mobilisation 
Nauja Kleist, Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen 
Peter Hansen, Institute of Anthropology, University of Copenhagen 
 
Demonstrating in Parliament Square  
In the afternoon of the 17th of March 2004, thousands of Somalilanders were waving their 
flags and banners and singing Somaliland slogans in Parliament Square in London. The 
crowd had started gathering outside the Home Office at about 10 in the morning, but, as it 
grew larger and larger during the day, had been relocated by the Metropolitan Police to 
Parliament Square. Not quite familiar with the colours and slogans of the crowd, most of the 
parliamentarians in Westminster and Portcullis House, and most of the people passing by 
the square, wondered who they were and what they were demonstrating for or against. To 
the media in the UK, the 17th of March 2004, was an important day, not because of the 
demonstration taking place in Parliament Square, but because the budget was presented by 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer to Parliament and the public. To the demonstrators and 
Somalilanders all over the world, however, the day was important for reasons, that had very 
little to do with the state of the economy and the public finances in the UK. On the 17th of 
March 2004 Somalilanders from all over England, and Scandinavia as well, came to London 
to protest in favour of the recognition of Somaliland. Demonstrating at the footsteps of Big 
Ben, the Somalilanders wished to open the eyes and ears of British parliamentarians and the 
international community to what they see as a legitimate claim to being accepted as a real 
nation state. In this sense, the 17th of March 2004 was meant for the demonstrators to be a 
milestone in the history of Somaliland, as it aimed at bringing an end to the ignorance and 
negligence of the international community on the issue of Somaliland. The demonstration 
was strategically organised to coincide with a visit made by the Somaliland president and 
his delegation to the United Kingdom. For the first time ever a president of Somaliland was 
on a semi-official visit to a western country. Previously the president had visited 
neighbouring countries like Djibouti and Ethiopia, but this visit was different as the 
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president and his delegation visited the United Kingdom, which is seen as Somaliland’s 
closest ally in their quest for independence.  
 
On the 17th of March 2004 Somalilanders came together to show their loyalty towards 
Somaliland and to honour the visiting Somaliland President and his delegation. The people 
involved in the demonstration behaved according to a “diasporic morality” (Werbner 2002) 
that is directed towards the wellbeing and future of Somaliland. In this paper we wish to 
analyse the meaning of “the Somaliland diaspora”, not as a nostalgic and aesthetic 
community, but as a moral community engaged in a transnational political struggle. We will 
analyse how different meanings of diaspora are employed and performed before, during and 
after the demonstration at Parliament Square. We unfold the demonstration in Parliament 
Square and the events relating to this event and argue that a possible and fruitful way of 
studying issues relating to “diaspora” is by exploring the ways the term is performed and 
actively used in transnational political mobilisations. The use of the term “diaspora” as an 
analytical concept is not unproblematic as it has the dangers of solidifying or essentialising 
social phenomena that are in fact fluid and always in the making. Therefore our 
understanding and use of “diaspora” is ambivalent and similar to James Clifford’s 
understanding of “culture” as a deeply compromised idea, yet something he cannot do 
without (Clifford 1988: 10).  
 
Methodologically and analytically we see the 17th of March 2004 as a “social situation” 
(Gluckman 1958) and apply the “extended case method and situational analysis” (Van 
Velsen 1967) in our attempt to understand the processes of diasporic identity formation and 
the performance of diaspora (Werbner 2002). In focusing on one specific event we wish to 
show how a diasporic event is constructed not only by a shared and publicly performed 
identity, often anchored in shared symbols and a communal history of suffering and a vision 
of return, but also by conflicting meanings and practices that exist within diasporas 
themselves and between diasporas and the host society. In the case of Somaliland, and 
indeed in relation to Somali politics in general, what is most striking, and what we see as 
generative and driving social forces in the process of diasporic identity formation, are the 
conflicting views, frictions and tensions that make up this particular social and political 
scene. The paper is not only based on interviewing and participating on the 17th of March 
2004 in London, however, but also draws on ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in 
Somaliland in 1997, 1998, 2003 and in the greater Copenhagen area in 1999 and 2003. As 
researchers we wish to stress that we try not to take sides relating to the recognition of 
Somaliland. As any researcher who undertakes social studies knows, “neutrality” is a 
difficult position to claim, yet we do not see the events analysed in this paper as either an 
argument for or against the legitimacy of the recognition of Somaliland. Before advancing 
our analysis of the events unfolding on the 17th we first of all need to explicate our 
understanding and use of the term “diaspora”.  
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Diaspora 
The first question to ask concerns the nature of ‘diaspora’ and its value as a theoretical and 
analytical concept. What and where is “diaspora”? Is it a state of being, a spatial container, a 
place as “in the diaspora” could suggest - or a group of people, “the diaspora”? Or is it 
rather, as Turner and Hansen have recently suggested, a set of discursive practices, which 
are performed, constructed and imagined (T.B. Hansen 2003; Turner 2003)? How can a 
concept with such global connotations as diaspora be contextualised, maybe even localised - 
and according to what principles (cf. Axel 2004)? 
 
In relation to Somaliland, it is important to underline that the term “diaspora” is not only a 
theoretical concept, but also a term that has entered processes of identity formation and 
political mobilisation within the Somaliland transnational community itself. Like the 
concept of culture, “diaspora” was developed theoretically within the social sciences and 
then used by the very people the concept aimed at analysing, in processes of self-portrayal. 
To avoid confusion between the two levels of analysis, we will start by outlining the two 
journeys of the concept of diaspora: as a theoretical and emic concept, and then elaborate on 
how we employ the concept. After this theoretical introduction, we describe the big 
demonstration and move on to the final section of the paper: a discussion of how the 
Somaliland diaspora and nation are performed, mobilised and articulated throughout the day 
as well as a discussion of the analytical value of different perceptions of the concept of 
diaspora.  
 
A theoretical journey 
Up until the beginning of the 1990s, the concept of diaspora was mainly employed in 
relation to the Jewish, Greek and Armenian histories as well as the Black Atlantic, the 
slaves and their descendants (Gilroy 1993). In the 1990s, however, diaspora made a come-
back in the social sciences, when a range of enthusiastic articles and books started to appear 
on the topic (i.e. Safran 1991; Brah 1994; Clifford 1994; Cohen 1997; van Hear 1998). 
Though the works differ on how they employ the concept, they share an idea of the spatial 
dispersal of a group of people from an existing or imaginary homeland that maintains a 
sense of collectivity over an extended period of time. Diasporic groups are said to be 
constituted by “an acceptance of an inescapable link with their past migration history” 
(Cohen 1997: ix), which is narrated, lived, reproduced and transformed in various ways 
(Brah 1994: 183). Diasporas are not characterised by a special kind of movement, but of the 
shared affiliations and senses of belonging to the “homeland” and to fellow “nationals” 
which might include the categories of refugees, migrants, family re-unified and naturalized 
citizens alike, often scattered across many different countries (Steen 1993; Crisp 1999). In 
this theoretical perspective, the emergence of diasporas is seen as a sign of globalising 
processes and diasporas as “the exemplary communities of the transnational moment” and 
“emblems of transnationalism” (Tölölyan 1991: 5-6) and as closely related to Appadurai’s 
notion of “ethnoscapes” (Appadurai 1990: 297). Following this line of argumentation, 
recent definitions see diasporas as transnational networks of dispersed political subjects who 
are connected by ties of co-responsibility across the boundaries of empires and nations 
(Werbner 2002: 136).  
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The concept of diaspora has also received a fair amount of critique, not the least from 
feminist researchers, who have pointed at an often problematic tendency to homogenise 
diasporic groups and neglect internal power differences and struggles (Brah 1994; Anthias 
1998). Critiques of the employment of diaspora as a “total identity” have suggested that the 
concept is more useful as a verb - diasporise - and an adjective - diasporic - than a noun - 
diaspora (T.B Hansen 2003; Turner 2003). Likewise Nina Glick Schiller and Georges 
Fouron criticise the enthusiastic embrace of diaspora studies and claim that it confounds 
different experiences and forms of consciousness of transborder belonging and 
identification (Schiller & Fouron 2001: 23). They suggest the alternative concept of long-
distance nationalism to designate “identification with a particular, existing state or the desire 
to construct a new state” (ibid), which can be one moment or aspect of diasporic formations. 
Furthermore, they suggest the term “transborder citizenry” to include migrants, their 
descendants and those who stayed in one single category (Schiller et al. 2001: 20).   
 
In our analysis, we take these critical objections into consideration. We are not going to 
employ diaspora as a designation of an a priori social fact - however tempting or handy it 
might be. Rather, we regard it as a concept with a political nature in that it might be at once 
claimed by and attributed to different migrant groups such as Somalis or Somalilanders. 
Still, we do not dismiss the term diaspora; what interests us here are the ongoing 
constructions and negotiations which are at play in the formations and claims of “being the 
Somaliland diaspora”. This means we pay attention to how terms such as diaspora, home 
and homelands are used and mobilised by different actors in relation to Somaliland. 
Claiming to be a diaspora, “feeling at home” or “rebuilding the nation” is intertwined with 
gender ideals and processes of inclusion and exclusion (Brah 1994; George 1996; Eriksen 
2002). Mobilising, performing and claiming to be the Somaliland diaspora during the big 
demonstration in Parliament Square and the following events show these mechanisms at 
play.  
 
From social sciences to Somali intellectuals 
The term diaspora has also gained popularity among scholars studying Somalis and different 
works referring to the term have started to appear. Such works include Yesterday – 
Tomorrow. Voices from the Somali Diaspora (Farah 2000), Muslims in the Diaspora. The 
Somali communities of London and Toronto (McGown 1999), and Somali and Kurdish 
Refugees in London. New Identities in the Diaspora (Griffiths 2002). Indeed the conference 
theme Diaspora and State Formation in the Horn of Africa is an example of the analytical 
and heuristic value many scholars of Somali migration have started to attribute to the 
concept.  
 
Even more interesting, the concept of diaspora has travelled, not only within the fashions of 
social science and among scholars of Somali migrants, but also into circles of Somali 
intellectuals who have begun to employ the word. Apart from books and reports about “the 
Somali diaspora” or “Somalis in the diaspora”, there is an abundance of homepages 
appealing to the “Somali diaspora” to support hospitals, schools, and other kinds of fund-
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raising projects; there are countless conference announcements and reports as well as adds 
for business companies targeting “the diaspora” as their customers, for instance money 
transfer companies such as Dahabshiil. A quick google search on “Somali diaspora” gives 
more than 10.000 hits1. The overwhelming large majority of homepages referring to 
“diaspora” are in English. The usage of the term “diaspora” seems to be limited to English 
speakers and readers - in short, the educated elite. Still, it is an important question what the 
term “diaspora” means when it is used by Somalis “abroad” and in Somaliland.   
 
First of all, “diaspora” is used as a noun - “the diaspora” - or a place - “in the diaspora” - 
and not as an adjective or a verb. In other words, “the diaspora” is something or rather 
somebody and seems to refer to Somalis who have made it either to the West as refugees or 
immigrants or maybe the Gulf States. In general, refugees living in countries like Ethiopia 
and Djibouti are not referred to as living in “the diaspora” but rather as “refugees living in 
neighbouring countries”. The fact that the term “diaspora” is not applied to these groups 
testifies to the social significance and value attached to this term. Furthermore, returnees 
from the West seem to continue to refer to themselves as part of “the diaspora” as does the 
surrounding society, often connecting the “diasporic position” with explicit economic and 
political expectations (P. Hansen 2004; Kleist 2003). In this sense, we might talk about a 
“Somaliland transborder citizenry”, but a citizenry which is still hierarchically positioned 
according to where the individual Somalilanders are and have been located, to the 
experiences they (are supposed to) have obtained and finally to their social status in relation 
to gender, age and clan affiliations. Or in other words, neither the term diaspora or 
transborder citizenry can be said to refer to homogenous or harmonic entities.  
 
Diaspora as a conflictual term  
Often what is noted in studies of “diasporas” is how they are structured around a shared 
sense of co-responsibility directed towards their homeland and that they perform and 
manifest themselves in public events like demonstrations or the collection of money for 
communal ends within “the diaspora”. However, the focus on the public sphere and the 
shared narratives and orientations directed towards real or imagined homelands should not 
lead us into celebrating the unity or homogeneity of “diasporas”. More than just displaying 
shared struggles and orientations, it is our understanding that diasporas are formed through 
conflict or tension existing between different groups, principles of social organization, 
norms and categories. The basic theoretical assumption behind this argument is that social 
relations, even those marked by conflict, are constitutive of meaning, practice and identity 
(Gluckman 1958). Somalilanders in the diaspora may claim a shared cultural purity and 
orientation, but essentially social movements like the Somaliland diaspora are culturally 
mixed and hybrid since they arise from within the new social and cultural configuration of 
the hybridized community (cf. Werbner 2001) and are formed through contrasting political 
agendas, histories and forms of social organisation. Earlier anthropological theories of 
liminality and conflict (see for example Turner 1979; Gluckman 1958; Epstein 1958; 
                                              
1 The search was made August 3, 2004, and resulted in 10.300 hits. Only the first thousand hits were shown 
and out of the first 630 hits, only one hit was in Somali. The remaning hits were said to be similar to the ones 
already shown. 
 AMID Working Paper Series 6 
Douglas 1966) are useful for our understanding of contemporary diaspora formations. In the 
detailed ethnographic description of rituals and myths, anthropologists have shown how the 
mixing of different cultural forms is often part of social dramas and performances and 
generative of meaning and practice. The divisions, conflicts and contestations that exist 
“within” and “outside” “the Somaliland diaspora” are indeed an example of this. Our 
argument rests on the assumption that in order to understand the diasporic constructions of a 
Somaliland national ideology and “diasporic practices” like the demonstration in Parliament 
Square, we need to pay attention to a social context characterised by conflict, tension and 
marginalisation.  
 
The Big Demonstration  
We now turn to the events unfolding before, during and after the 17th of March 2004. We do this in 
order to analyse how “diaspora” is performed, claimed and emerging within a process of 
transnational political mobilisation. Firstly, we will analyse the immediate events taking place 
before the demonstration. Secondly, we focus on the demonstration in London itself. Thirdly, we 
describe and analyse events unfolding in Portcullis House, and finally we close our case study by 
describing a reception held at The Landmark Hotel.  
 
Somaliland Debate in Parliament  
Prior to the demonstration on the 17th and the president’s visit to the UK, the all party 
Select Committee on International Development of the House of Commons visited 
Somaliland on the 24th and 25th of January 2004. Newspapers in Somaliland stressed that 
the Committee was the largest group of British politicians to visit Somaliland since the days 
of independence and that the visit signalled a heightened attention and understanding from 
the international community in general and the UK government in particular towards the 
predicament and possible recognition of Somaliland.  
 
On the 4th of February 2004, following the Committee’s return to the UK, a debate on 
Somaliland was held in the House of Commons. Present at this debate were eight members 
of the Committee, the Secretary of State for International Development as well as an 
interested crowd of about twenty Somalilanders living in the UK, who had come to London 
to attend the debate in Parliament. At the debate the committee members informed The 
Secretary of State for International Development and the public in general about their 
impressions from their recent visit to Somaliland. Despite representing different political 
parties, the different Committee members presented a similar historical understanding of 
Somaliland and a shared view that the UK should do more to assist Somaliland financially 
and politically. The fact that Somaliland used to be a British protectorate and, according to 
the Committee members, that Somalilanders served the Empire with loyalty and affection, 
for example during the Second World War, put a special responsibility upon the UK to take 
the lead in advancing the arguments of Somaliland, the Committee members agreed. They 
also argued that the lack of recognition was getting in the way of fulfilling the millennium 
goals for development in Somaliland and that more should be done to actively support the 
efforts of the government of Somaliland to create a modern, democratic state. They also 
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underlined that the attempt in Nairobi to create a government for the whole of Somalia was 
unrealistic as there has been too much antagonism between Somaliland and Somalia. The 
committee members underlined that the solution presented to Somaliland was not fair or 
realistic, since it asked them to join the people that oppressed them for many years instead 
of actually acknowledging and rewarding the efforts they have achieved in Somaliland 
(House of Commons 2004).  
 
During the two hours long debate the Committee members presented a version of the 
political history of Somalia and Somaliland that firmly rooted Somaliland in a legitimate 
claim to independence. During the debate it was evident that the Committee members 
subscribed to a popular discourse on Somaliland independence that is found both in 
Somaliland and among diasporic Somalilanders. According to this popular discourse, 
Somaliland has done everything right, but is being ignored by the international community. 
Somaliland is depicted as a place in the Horn of Africa where there is genuine peace, unity 
and a functioning state, whereas Somalia is depicted as a place where there is war and lack 
of state. The Committee members also agreed that Somaliland is extremely poor and 
deserved increased financial help from the UK government. They agreed that the lack of 
recognition is getting in the way of further developments in Somaliland. They stressed that 
it is almost impossible to attract international investments to a country that is not 
recognised. If Somaliland achieves its recognition it would be possible to support the 
economic development of Somaliland substantially. For example, one of the Committee 
members underlined, it would be possible to explore Somaliland’s oil and mineral reserves 
which, according to him and popular Somaliland national imagining, are known to be 
substantial. In sum, the Committee members presented a picture of Somaliland as a de facto 
functioning nation state, complete with its own colonial and political history, state 
institutions, government policies and a dedicated and concerned citizenry dispersed all over 
the world. Therefore the strategy pursued by “the international community” to insist on a 
solution for all of Somalia, including Somaliland, is getting in the way of a legitimate claim 
to self-determination and is hindering Somaliland from developing into a prosperous and 
truly democratic state in area of Africa, that is known to be ravaged by war, corruption and 
destruction.  
 
Seen from a Somaliland point of view, the response from the Secretary of State for 
International Development, was both positive and negative. He underlined that he agreed to 
what had been said about the predicament and achievements of Somaliland, but also 
reiterated that the UK government’s position on the recognition of Somaliland was to wait 
and see what comes out of the ongoing peace talks in Nairobi and that not only people in 
Somaliland but in all of Somalia have the right to peace and prosperity. As a result of the 
positive experiences and sentiments towards Somaliland, the Committee members invited 
the president of Somaliland to come to the UK on a semi-official visit.  
 
Parliament Square  
On the 15th and 16th of March the President had met with different British politicians, 
ministers and civil servants in the British government. On the 17th of March the President 
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was to continue his series of meetings with British politicians and civil servants and later in 
the afternoon address the House of Commons personally. We had been told that the 
demonstration was to start at 10 in the morning in front of the Home Office. When we got 
there at around 10.30 there were no Somalilanders in sight. The only other people there, 
were some construction workers and five policemen. The policemen were looking 
sceptically at us as if they did not believe that no more than a few individuals would ever 
turn up for the demonstration and that their day had been wasted. The policemen had been 
there the previous two days as well and their scepticism was just. The day before, on the 
16th of March 2004, only nine Somalilanders had shown up for the demonstration and at 
times the policemen had outnumbered the demonstrators.  
 
After an hour two women and one man had shown up for the demonstration. The man was 
around fifty years old and had come from Norway to participate in the demonstration. The 
two women who had also shown up were in their twenties. They were cousins and both 
from London. We knew them from the demonstration the day before where they were 
among the few Somalilanders that had shown up. One of them worked as a nurse at a 
hospital in West London. She was born in London and had never actually seen Somaliland. 
Her parents were from Hargeisa and they lived together with her and her brothers and sisters 
in London. The other woman was born in Hargeisa. She married a Somali man from 
London and had come to live with him and their children. She did not have a job, spoke 
only a few words of English but was taking English lessons.  
 
Within another hour or so, a few more men and women had joined the demonstration. There 
were a few men from Cardiff, where there is a large “Somaliland community”. Before the 
war and the break-up of Somalia into different political regions, the Somalis living in 
Cardiff were not explicit Somalilanders but just Somalis. Now that Somaliland was trying to 
establish a nation state without their brothers and sisters in the south of Somalia, the identity 
of forming an explicit “Somaliland community” in Cardiff had grown equally stronger. One 
of the men from Cardiff worked as a “community worker within the Somaliland 
community”. He and some Somaliland friends had an NGO in Cardiff that helped 
Somalilanders, as well as other Somalis, with all sorts of legal and practical matters. He told 
us that he was working on a project of collecting the life histories of the old Somaliland 
seamen living in Cardiff. There are no Somalilanders or Somalis working as seamen any 
longer. He wanted to document their history and tell the untold story about the legacy of the 
Somaliland community in Cardiff and the United Kingdom.  
 
As we were waiting for more people to join the demonstration, we discussed the 
“organisational skills” of Somalis with the few who had shown up. They told us that 
different persons and organisations had organised to meet at different places and at different 
times during the day. The Somaliland Mission in East London had issued an invitation on 
the internet that the demonstration would begin at two in the afternoon outside Downing 
Street 10. The Envoy for the recognition of Somaliland had issued an invitation in the local 
Somaliland newspaper in the UK for people to meet the 15th, 16th and 17th of March from 
10 am to 4 pm outside the Home Office. A third group of Somalilanders had distributed an 
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invitation within the community that they would meet on the 17th of March at 3 pm 
opposite Downing Street 10. Jokingly, yet with a touch of insight into own shortcomings, 
the few demonstrators told us that coordination within the community in the UK or the 
Nordic countries was poor. They pointed out that being part of an oral network community, 
they were good at talking and exchanging information about almost everything, but very 
poor at getting a job done or organising almost anything. This is reflected in the fact that 
there is no well-defined centre of political power within the Somaliland community in the 
diaspora and that anyone who feels an obligation and urge to do something can do so, they 
explained. The fact that several different invitations had been distributed within the 
community was also interpreted among the few arrivals as a political statement by the part 
of the Somaliland diaspora that were members of the political opposition to the ruling party 
in Somaliland. Clearly, the Somaliland opposition to the President and his government in 
Somaliland would try to sabotage the demonstration by distributing different invitations and 
thereby divide the Somalilanders living in the UK.  
 
During the day the demonstration grew larger and larger and people were beginning to feel 
more and more optimistic and enthusiastic as Somalilanders from different parts of the UK 
turned up at the demonstration. Not only Somalilanders from the United Kingdom but also 
from Scandinavia arrived to take part in the demonstration. At one point the demonstration 
grew too large for the pavement outside the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police 
relocated it to Parliament Square. At this state the initial nervousness of ever being able to 
form one coherent demonstrating community had been replaced by joy and confidence.  
 
At the demonstration both men and women, young and old presented the colours of 
Somaliland and waved banners and posters with messages relating to Somaliland’s claim to 
independence. This was the day for Somalilanders to stand united in their joint effort to 
achieve recognition. The Somaliland flag played an important symbolic role during the 
demonstration. The demonstrators were of course waving Somaliland flags, as could be 
expected on an occasion like this, but more than this, many had also wrapped it around their 
bodies, or made hats and dresses out of the green, white and red colours, or painted the flag 
on their faces as if to embody their sense of national identity and loyalty towards 
Somaliland. Furthermore, several persons carried t-shirts with the flag on their stomach and 
the text “Rebirth of Somaliland” printed on them. Besides the Somaliland flag, many of the 
demonstrators had also brought Union Jacks as if to show that Somaliland and the UK share 
an unbreakable colonial past and to highlight that they have developed some form of loyalty 
and affection for their second motherland. The demonstrators were also waving their 
homemade posters and banners carrying messages referring to the unrecognised status and 
democratic achievements of Somaliland. With slogans like: “Somaliland is not prepared to 
destroy its nation by joining the destroyers”, “Somaliland fulfils the condition of 
democracy”, “Somaliland asks for recognition from the World. We are a democracy”; 
“Somaliland is a model for effective nation building in Africa”, “Free election. Free Society. 
Free Press. Hallmark of Somaliland” and “No to Somalia. Yes to Somaliland”, the 
demonstrators aimed at portraying Somaliland as a legitimate and democratic nation state.  
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Portcullis House 
About 5 p.m., some of the demonstrators made their way to Portcullis House, House of 
Commons, to listen to the President of Somaliland, Dahir Riyaale Kaahin, and his 
delegation. About 200 people filled up the room to the last chair and latecomers had to 
stand. The majority of the audience consisted of well-dressed Somaliland men, some 
Somaliland women and a few white researchers, consultants and MPs. The Somaliland 
delegation included the President, several members of the Guurti, the House of Elders, and 
not the least the minister of foreign affairs, Edna Aden, as the only woman in the delegation.  
 
While the demonstration still continued outside, the meeting in Portcullis House represented 
a completely different scene. Not only was the audience much smaller, it was selected, 
seated and co-ordinated along the lines of an ordinary parliamentary dialogue. The feeling 
of festivity, enthusiasm and the hopeful making of Somaliland history, however, made this 
more than an ordinary event. Mr. Tony Worthington, MP, who visited Somaliland with the 
Committee in January 2004 and before that in 1992, chaired the session and welcomed the 
delegates in this spirit. As an outspoken proponent of the recognition of Somaliland, 
Worthington fully matched the delegation and the Somaliland-British audience in his 
celebration and explicit articulation of the achievements of “the diaspora” and of the 
Somaliland nation. Likewise his denunciation of the relationship to Somalia was equally 
outspoken. Referring to the union between Somalia and Somaliland, Worthington claimed 
that “you were not getting a fair deal” and “you regretted it”. He furthermore expressed his 
understanding that Somaliland has remained outside the peace negotiations of Somalia 
“because you could not co-operate with people such as General Morgan, known as the 
butcher of Hargeisa”. Concluding his speech with the words, that he would now “allow your 
President to speak to you”, Worthington explicitly recognized the Somalilanders present as 
part of a nation with a president. 
 
The articulations of a nation and a nation state continued throughout the meeting. President 
Riyale Kaahin, reading out aloud, rehearsed the colonial history of Somaliland as a British 
colony, arguing that Somaliland - in opposition to Somalia - is not a failed state. “When 
Eritrea, Serbia and Bosnia could be recognised - why not Somaliland”? Kaahin asked, 
receiving a standing applause for his speech. Following the President’s speech, Worthington 
opened the floor for questions, though he underlined that he would prioritise non-
Somalilanders to ask questions thereby indicating a division of the audience between white 
British and black Somalilanders. Apparently, the priority of non-Somalilanders was to give 
the British audience a chance to interrogate the delegation and avoid a discussion of 
domestic Somaliland affairs as the session proceeded, however, it became clear that the 
definition of the black audience as consisting of Somalilanders only did not hold water. 
 
After the speech of the President, the floor was opened for questions. As a first question the 
delegation was asked how the government intends to co-ordinate the reconstruction work 
undertaken by the diaspora. The reply of the minister of foreign affairs, Edna Aden, was that 
the government is going to establish a co-ordinating body in the Ministry of State 
underlining the importance of ‘the diaspora’. This was also emphasised by her statement 
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that “The diaspora has brought Somaliland to where it is today. Somaliland mobilised 
itself”, thereby articulating the unity of Somalilanders all over the world and in Somaliland, 
as a sort of transborder citizenry.  
 
A further range of questions focused on the role of the diaspora and on the political relations 
between Somaliland, Somalia and the neighbouring countries. The answers pointed at the 
importance of the Somaliland relations to the diaspora and the UK, and the impossible 
relations to Somalia. The atmosphere was festive and good questions, answers and one-
liners were rewarded with apprehensive applause and laughter from the floor. Videos and 
photos were taken. Jokes were told. Towards the end of the session, Abdi Ismail Samatar, a 
Somali-American Professor took the floor. Presenting himself as from the North, but not as 
a Somalilander, Samatar immediately stirred up a fuss. Some of the audience started to 
shout and complain, and while some insisted that “Only Somalilanders can talk!”, others 
hissed “Give him a chance”. After a little while, Samatar was allowed to speak. Stating that 
he felt threatened, Samatar argued that the whole of Somalia deserved to be at peace from 
North to South – and then the different parts of Somalia could decide their futures. After 
this intervention, Samatar left Portcullis House, but later published his version of the 
meeting on a Somali web page, www.hornafrik.com (Samatar 2004). 
 
Towards the end of the session and after Worthington had closed for questions, a Somali 
woman asked for the floor - the first woman apart from Edna Aden to speak. Insisting that 
the meeting was now over and in spite of comments like “It is time for the ladies”, 
Worthington cut her off, joking that since he had been told in Somaliland that Edna Aden 
equalled ten men, there had been gender equity, and the woman was silenced. The meeting 
was then concluded and the audience slowly left Portcullis House, joining the demonstration 
again or heading somewhere else to celebrate the event. Others hurried towards taxis and 
the Underground. It was time for the reception.   
 
The Landmark Hotel 
Even though we had not been officially invited, two young Somali women whom we had 
met during the session insisted that we could just turn up at the reception anyway. They had 
not been invited either, but seemed to know some of the organisers and insisted that it was 
no problem. So we all took the Underground to Marigold Station in a fashionable part of 
London and walked into The Landmark Hotel, a very posh hotel. After a couple of minutes 
of negotiation, we were allowed to enter. Passing through an impressive hall with golden 
chandeliers, marble floor and luxurious furniture, we entered another huge room with small 
reception tables and an abundant buffet with Somali, Italian and French style food. In one 
end of this room, chairs were lined up for people to sit comfortably and listen to the 
speeches before the dinner. The whole place was filled with beautifully dressed 
Somalilanders in dress suits, evening gowns, high heels, shimmering jewellery and shiny 
long dresses with a delicate and sweet scent of ussi, a special kind of Somali incense. The 
President, his delegation, the organisers as well as representatives of organisations, models, 
politicians and reporters, in short, the elite of the Somaliland-British communities were all 
there - as well as a few British MPs.   
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The reception was arranged by the “UK Somaliland Communities”, a name for a loosely 
organised group of patriotic Somalilanders in the UK formed specifically with the purpose 
of organising the events relating to the visit of the president, the Welsh Somaliland 
Committee and the Somaliland Mission in the UK. The arrangement hosted several hundred 
guests and days of work and large amounts of money had gone into the organisation of the 
reception, because, as some people said, “the delegation deserves it”. Celebrating the 
delegation and the historic moment of the semi-official visit, the reception was also an 
opportunity to mingle, discuss, make contacts and take photos of each other and maybe of 
the President and his delegation. The reception could be said to be a celebration of the 
Somaliland nation and its achievements towards official recognition. It could also be said to 
be a social event turning the stereotypical image of the “marginalised Somalilanders” upside 
down, making a sumptuous reception everybody could be proud of and talk about for days. 
As such, the reception represented a third stage of the big demonstration, where the extent, 
presence and political commitment of the Somaliland communities were demonstrated 
during the day, and now celebrated.  
 
The reception started out with a range of speakers introduced by two Somaliland women. 
The first speaker was Emeritus Professor in Social Anthropology, I.M. Lewis, from the 
London School of Economics. As any student of Somali affairs will know, Lewis is 
probably the most important figure in the development of Somali studies and has done 
extensive fieldwork since the 1950s in the former British Protectorate and later in Somalia. 
As such, Lewis was the perfect reminder of the British past in Somaliland and this was also 
the message of his speech - a historical and political account of Somaliland and the British 
colonial and post-colonial engagement. Lewis made explicit his support of the recognition 
of Somaliland, blaming the international society in general and the British government in 
particular that they continue to ignore the virtues of Somaliland in favour of their support of 
the ongoing peace negotiations in Somalia. Towards the end of his speech, and to the great 
delight of the audience, Lewis proclaimed that the Italians “would make a more useful 
contribution if they applied some of their expertise in dealing with the Mafia to sorting out 
Mogadishu”, thereby invoking the often noted differences in colonial experience and style 
of Somaliland and “the South”. Finally, Lewis concluded that the recognition of Somaliland 
would not damage “the ethnic identity of the Somali people and their socio-economic 
cohesion”, but, on the contrary, serve as a wakeup call to the southern politicians. Like 
Samatar, Lewis later published his speech on www.hornafrik.com (Lewis 2004), but 
without direct reference to the demonstration and the other events2. 
 
Also a Swedish politician, who had acted as an observer of the presidential election in 
Somaliland, gave a speech. Due to the unrecognised status of Somaliland, no official 
international observers were present during elections, but a large number of unofficial 
observers were in Somaliland. These observers were present due to their own interest or as 
members of organisations, consulting agencies, the British embassy in Ethiopia, or other 
interested parties. Likewise a large number of politically engaged Somalilanders from “the 
                                              
2 The quotations in our paper are taken from the Internet text (Lewis 2004), where they correspond with our 
notes taken during his talk at the reception.  
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diaspora” were present3. The message of the Swedish politician was that the election was 
carried out according to international standards and that the disputed result, with only 80 
votes in favour of Kaahin, was just. Like I.M. Lewis, the “Swedish observer” could be said 
to add legitimacy to the narrative of the official national Somaliland elections and ideology 
and take part in the celebration of the government and president.   
 
After a couple of more speakers, Edna Aden, the minister of foreign affairs spoke on behalf 
of the president. Edna Aden, who is trained as a midwife and who has founded a maternity 
hospital in Hargeisa, coupled the nationalistic imaginary of the (re)birth of the Somaliland 
nation with the idea of difference in relation to Somalia. She said:    
 
“I never expected, when I came to UK to study nursing and later midwifery, that I would be a 
member of a team trying to deliver a nation. Somaliland grew into a nation in spite of the 
nation who tried to kill them, but not fighting back, respecting human rights. We separated 
because of basic differences with people from Somalia. We are Somalilanders and they are 
Somalis. It is not a question of North and South, we are from Somaliland, it has a name and a 
place on the map. Somaliland is here to stay. You should inform the world of who you are, 
you should co-ordinate it.”  
 
Edna Aden got standing applause in a both enthusiastic and emotional atmosphere. Her 
employment of the imaginary of giving birth to a nation points to a gendering of the nation 
in which the more masculine practices of Somaliland politics with only very few female 
politicians is challenged. Or rather, the reproduction of the nation is feminised and 
familiarised (cf. Eriksen 2002). Going on to address and encourage the audience to ‘inform 
the world about who they are’ in a co-ordinated way, Edna Aden delivered an outspoken 
example of mobilisation of (long-distance) nationalism, transformed into an at once local 
and global political responsibility.  
Nations and Empires: Political Kinship and Differences 
Obviously, the big demonstration can be analysed and interpreted in a number of ways. As 
already indicated, it was as much a social event as a political manifestation. Or in other 
words, it was both a demonstration in the sense of a public meeting as well as in the sense of 
a showing British politicians and the British public, other Somalis - and maybe even each 
other as well - that there is such a thing as a Somaliland nation. In this part of the paper, we 
will focus on the political, cultural, social and historical aspects of the demonstration, the 
session in Portcullis House and the reception to analyse how these events are part of a larger 
national and diasporic framework. All four levels are part of the mobilisation and 
performance of a contested Somaliland nationalist ideology, which highlights issues of 
sameness as well as difference. 
 
                                              
3 Thanks to Elin Svedjemo for sharing this information.  
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Colonial ties 
The strong linkages between Britain and Somaliland had been underlined within the past 
months, not only by Somalilanders seeking recognition of the country, but also by the 
British Parliamentarians who as members of the Select Committee on International 
Development visited and debated Somaliland in Parliament. During the debate in Parliament 
both Somalilanders and the Committee members shared the notion that the UK has a special 
moral responsibility to support Somaliland because of their shared colonial past. Also, the 
Committee members underlined that even today the population of Somaliland displayed 
loyalty and affection for the UK.  
 
During the debate in Parliament in February 2004, reference was made to a statement made 
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on his visit to Hargeisa on the 9th of February 
1959. In the statement the Secretary underlined that  
 
“whatever the eventual destiny of the Protectorate, Her Majesty’s Government will continue 
to take an interest in the welfare of its inhabitants, and will in the light of the circumstances 
prevailing from time to time, be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the 
continuation of financial assistance within the limits of the amount of aid at present being 
provided to the Protectorate”.  
 
Mr. Tony Baldry of the Committee underlined that this statement was reiterated in a 
Colonial Office report that was submitted to Parliament on independence. On 4th of May 
1960 the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, told the house, that  
 
“…it is Her Majesty’s Government’s hope that whatever may be the constitutional future of 
the Protectorate, the friendship which has been built up between its people and those of the 
United Kingdom for so many years will continue and indeed flourish”.  
 
Mr. Tony Baldry stressed that if there ever was a need for the UK to give friendship and 
assistance to Somaliland, it was now. The committee members underlined that the closeness 
between the UK and Somaliland is also found today in the fact that there are many British 
citizens of Somaliland origin now living in Somaliland, that some of the committee 
members’ constituency live part time in Somaliland, and that the UK Somaliland diaspora 
has played a vital part in the rebuilding of Somaliland.  
 
Following up on this positive attitude towards recognition, one of the most important 
messages of the demonstration was to remind the British government of its past as 
coloniser. During the demonstration, a large amount of posters with a map of Somaliland 
surrounded by the words “Republic of Somaliland” and “British Somaliland Protectorate” 
were handed out and taped on to the demonstrators bodies or held in front of them. This 
focus on the British-Somaliland past is at least two-fold. First of all, should Britain 
recognise Somaliland, it might very well be the first step in a range of recognitions of other 
countries - at least, this is what Somaliland politicians seem to hope. Secondly, the British 
colonial past and thus colonial borders means that the country is in accordance with the 
principle of the African Union, which maintains that the borders of African nation states 
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must not violate the colonial borders. Thirdly, Somaliland did receive its Independence on 
the 26th of June 1960, that is four days before it united into the Republic of Somalia and 
Somaliland politicians therefore claim that since the country has once been recognised as an 
independent nation state, it could and should obtain this status again.  
 
Somaliland thus re-claims its nationhood along several lines of arguments and strategies. 
One is to set the date of Somaliland Independence to 1960 and not 1991. Accordingly, when 
Mr. Tony Worthington welcomed the delegates at Portcullis House and dated independence 
to 1991, the minister of foreign affairs, Edna Aden, immediately corrected him. Stating the 
date of international recognition of Somaliland to the year of 1961, the reunion with 
Somalia is turned into a historical, illegitimate and unhappy parenthesis, which is now over. 
On a broader level, this strategy of de-legitimisation of the union and thereby the Republic 
of Somalia is also related to the failure of Somalia in terms of unifying all the Somali- 
speaking areas in one nation state, of which the union of the British Protectorate and the UN 
Trusteeship of Somalia was supposed to be the first step. Furthermore, it is claimed that the 
treaty of union was never signed by Somaliland and therefore that the Republic of Somalia 
has been an invalid arrangement the whole time. Returning to the political arguments, which 
were actually articulated during the big demonstration, the illegitimacy of the Republic of 
Somalia was however more linked to the arguments of failed states.  
 
As emphasised both by President Riyaale Kaahin and other members of the delegation, by 
Worthington and later I.M. Lewis, the union with Somalia turned out unhappily, due to the 
failure of Somalia and most especially the dictatorship of general Siyad Barre. President 
Riyaale Kaahin, not only invoking the past, but also the future, reminded the audience about 
September 11, 2001 and the dangers of terrorism and failed states “in the fast-shrinking 
world of ours”. In contrast to Somalia, where suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists have been 
detained, Somaliland, Kaahin argued, is peaceful, stable, democratic and, most important, 
“no building ground for terrorists”. However, while emphasising that Somaliland is not a 
failed state, Kaahin also seemed to imply that Somaliland has not unfolded its full potential 
for securing peace and stability in the region, as Somaliland cannot “co-operate with 
international trade organisations, does not attract investments or fight the war of terrorism”. 
His statement, however, did not refer to the sad killings of foreign aid workers, which puts a 
more gloomy perspective on the claimed peacefulness of Somaliland. From October 2003 to 
March 2004, altogether five foreigners have been killed; the latest incident took place just a 
few days after the demonstration and speech at Portcullis House. All killings happened 
while prominent Somaliland politicians were abroad to promote the recognition of 
Somaliland and the responsibility of the killings has accordingly been blamed on “terrorists 
from the South” who wish to destabilise Somaliland, scare foreign organisations to stay 
away, and disturb the peaceful image of the country. This issue was not addressed by 
Kaahin, who rather seemed to indicate that recognition of Somaliland would be a step 
towards more stability and a more effective war against terrorism; a win-win situation for 
both Somaliland and the UK, indeed for all responsible states hoping for more stability in 
the region.  
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Later that day, during the reception at night, Lewis also referred to the number of failed 
peace accords and negotiations as well as the absence of a government in Somalia. In his 
words, the peace negotiations are more about “the division of power and economic interest 
among a squabbling bunch of predatory gangsters”, who “should have been arrested in 
Kenya as suspected war crimes perpetrators” (Lewis 2004). The legitimacy – and 
accordingly recognition - of Somaliland is, in other words, linked both to the colonial past 
of Somaliland as a British Protectorate as well as to the de-legitimacy of the failed state of 
Somalia in its claims to keep Somaliland as a part of the state territory.  
 
The colonial past was also invoked in the question of difference both politically and 
culturally between Somaliland and Somalia, due to differences in the Italian and British 
colonisation. This argument is often related to the “Italianisation” of Somalia - the corrupt 
Mafia culture of the Somalia Italiana and the Italian administrated UN Trusteeship of 
Somalia - in contrast to the “pure” and “authentic” culture in the British Protectorate. This 
“purity”, the argument goes, is due to the small number of British officials in the 
Protectorate during colonisation and the claimed British colonial politics of non-intervention 
in terms of culture. The politics of non-intervention is said to have been even more 
outspoken in the Protectorate where local warriors and the resistance movement of 
Mohamed Abdullah Hassan, the so-called “Mad Mullah”, forcefully challenged the 
colonisers from the beginning of colonisation until 1920.  
 
This argument of a pure and authentic culture due to the distance between the British 
colonisers and the Somaliland colonial subjects was not revived during the parliamentary 
session or the reception. On the contrary: close colonial ties, loyalty, friendship, bonds of 
kinship and even allegiance to the Queen were emphasised. Worthington, visibly impressed, 
told that his recent delegation to Somaliland was received with signs stating “The Queen is 
our Mother”. President Riyaale Kaahin expressed his hope that the friendship between Great 
Britain and Somaliland that existed at the time of Independence in 1960 could continue in 
the future and be revived between the two nations. The Deputy Speaker of the House of 
Elders, the Guurti, however, was more critical when he reminded the British of the service 
of the Somalilanders during the two world wars. A British MP asked him about 
Somaliland’s relations towards its neighbouring countries. The Deputy Speaker replied by 
recounting that Somaliland had not asked Britain about its relations with other countries 
when they were called upon to join the British Forces at the outbreak of the Second World 
War, but had in fact supported its friend without any questions asked. Also, the Deputy 
Speaker blamed the British for not educating their former colonial subjects while “the 
Somalis in Somalia had been taught tricks by Italy for ten years”. Continuing that the British 
failed to help the former Protectorate in this situation, he exclaimed, that “we are British 
orphans”, thereby emphasising a mixture of parental bonds and failed responsibility from 
the side of the British, i.e. the missing parents. As already mentioned, the image of birth and 
kinship had been a theme throughout the day, printed on t-shirts and banners, invoked by 
the coupling of both the Somaliland flag and Union Jack and articulated by politicians, most 
forcefully by foreign minister Edna Aden when she invoked the imaginary of delivering a 
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nation. Only this time, the parents were not supposed to be the British, but the 
Somalilanders themselves - in diaspora and in Somaliland. 
 
Diaspora, Liminality and Conflict  
Looking at the events relating to the demonstration in Parliament Square, one first of all 
sees the shared expression of “a diaspora” organised around shared histories, symbols and 
political agendas. Also Somalilanders living in “the diaspora” performed according to what 
was expected from members of the Somaliland “transborder citizenry” (Glick Schiller and 
Fouron 2001: 20) that are closer to the centres of political power than Somalilanders living 
in Somaliland: they showed up at the demonstration, backed the arguments presented to the 
international community in general and the British parliamentarians in particular, organised 
a reception for the visiting delegation and thereby played their role regarding the 
recognition of Somaliland and towards the visiting homeland politicians and government 
officials. The demonstrators played their part as good Somaliland citizens living in the 
diaspora caring about the future and wellbeing of their homeland. The notion that the 
demonstrating Somalilanders were somehow doing what was expected from them as “good 
Somalilanders” was highlighted in one of the invitations distributed within the Somaliland 
community in London a few days before the demonstration took place. The invitation had 
the design and colours of the Somaliland flag upon which was written:  
 
“Official UK State Visit: President of Somaliland: Mr Dahir Riyaale”, “Somalilanders this is 
it: it is now or never”, “Your country needs your support”, “take the day off, whatever you 
are doing!”, “bring your sirens, drums, flags, etc.”, “Make sure you play your role regarding 
the recognition of Somaliland!!!” and “Tell your mum and dad and everyone else you 
know!!!”.  
 
As exemplified in the invitation, shared symbols like the flag of Somaliland and the image 
of a community unified in achieving the same goals were used in an effort to mobilise 
Somalilanders. However, to understand the public ritual in Parliament Square and related 
events and agendas, one needs to look behind the apparent unifying political goal of 
achieving independence. In other words, one needs to contextualise the demonstration and 
public expressions of political agendas within a sphere of challenges, conflicts and 
ambiguities relating to the Somaliland and Somali communities in the UK and the 
ambiguous status of Somaliland within the international order of nation states.  
 
Within a world of nation states Somaliland remains unrealised as a political community. 
Following Victor Turner’s (1979) theory on liminality and communitas in the performance 
of public rituals, we can arrive at a clearer understanding of what was taking place in 
Parliament Square. Turner developed his theory of liminality on the basis of Van Gennep’s 
(1909) description of a rite de passage. Rites of passage are rituals marking the passage of 
one state of life and entry into another, e.g. birth, puberty, marriage, initiation or death. In 
this sense rites of passage are rites that accompany every change of place, state, social 
position and age. Van Gennep (ibid) characterised rites of passage as being composed of a 
phase of separation, margin or limen (signifying ‘threshold’ in Latin), and aggregation. The 
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liminal phase is characterised by ambiguity as this phase is marked neither by the attributes 
of the past nor by the coming state. Liminal entities are neither here nor there, they are 
betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom and convention 
(Turner 1979:95). In the liminal phase normal rules and social hierarchies are negated and 
instead replaced by a heightened sense of solidarity between persons undergoing the ritual 
(ibid).  
 
In a similar way Somaliland is in a liminal phase within the system of nation states. On the 
one hand, Somaliland is not ravaged by civil war, lawlessness and general chaos. On the 
other hand however, Somaliland is not a sovereign nation state. Because of its ambiguous or 
liminal status Somaliland is subjected to practices by international actors that are not 
applied to sovereign nation states. For example, the United Nations does not refer to 
Somaliland as Somaliland, yet in its daily dealings with the political leadership in 
Somaliland and in its operation of numerous UN agencies in Somaliland there is an 
acknowledgement of the authority of the Somaliland state. Also due to the liminal status, the 
UNHCR in Somaliland refers directly to UN headquarters in Geneva and not to Nairobi, as 
other UN agencies in Somaliland do. The liminal or marginal status of Somaliland provides 
a very powerful base for mobilising solidarity among Somalilanders who identify with the 
project of achieving independence. At the demonstration in London, Somalilanders formed 
a visible and existing community. Somalilanders from all over the United Kingdom and 
Northern Europe were united in London because of their liminal status within the 
international system of nation states. In this sense what defines the community of 
Somalilanders as a political categorical identity is their status as a “non-community” within 
the international order of nation states. Turner’s observation that liminality is often likened 
to death and being in the womb (1979:95) corresponds beautifully with the popular image 
within Somaliland national discourse of a nation that is once again “being reborn” and given 
life through “delivery”. Following Turner, the fact that Somaliland remains unrecognised 
provides a very powerful base of identity for the abstract community of Somalilanders. The 
image that Somaliland and the Somaliland transborder citizenry are somehow at present “on 
the move”, from somewhere to somewhere else, also resembles the religious pilgrimage 
analysed by Turner (1974). According to Turner (ibid) pilgrims experience an intensified 
sense of sacredness and community, referred to by Turner as “communitas”. The sense of 
being left out and forgotten by the world, yet still having the possibility of concluding the 
pilgrimage, moving into the state of being a real internationally recognised nation state, 
enables people to transcend differences and problems. No one has ever stopped to reflect on 
what will happen within Somaliland and the Somaliland transborder citizenry if Somaliland 
is recognised, the pilgrimage comes to an end and the sense of “communitas” disappears. 
Will it stir up old antagonisms and possibly instigate new fighting within Somaliland? Will 
the political realization of Somaliland in a paradoxical way lead to its disintegration? Or 
will the recognition of Somaliland also have some of the imagined positive effects of 
prosperity and stability that many Somalilanders “abroad and at home” dream about?  
 
The demonstration in Parliament Square tells us something about the nature of ‘the 
Somaliland diaspora’ and “the Somaliland community”. These phenomena, identities or 
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positions are not social facts existing without the active ongoing constructions taking place, 
for example, at a demonstration. In this sense the “imagined community” of Somalilanders 
would not exist, or at least have different manifestations, if it was not based in and causing 
social interaction. To position the demonstration within its social contexts is also to allow 
analytical space for all the aspects that are problematic and yet generative of the 
construction of a shared political ideology and horizon. On several occasions before, during 
and after the demonstration the image of a unified and well disciplined and dedicated 
citizenry was challenged and yet in a more subtle way produced. While waiting for people 
to show up for the demonstration, the few Somalilanders present were very critical of most 
things and expressed concerns about the present political leadership in Somaliland. They 
told us that the President really was not a president, because he was really bad at addressing 
the people, was not able to govern the country and that he was not only in the UK to discuss 
development aid and recognition, but also to sign documents allowing the UK to return 
rejected asylum seekers to Somaliland. Furthermore, they told us that people probably 
would not show up and that the only Somalilanders with discipline were women since all 
the men were busy chewing khat or being unemployed. Moreover, they told us that people 
were too occupied with clan and therefore not really able and ready to form a modern nation 
state based on a different way of social organisation. Contrary to the official discourse they 
told us that people’s loyalties were not first and foremost directed at the wellbeing of 
Somaliland. On the contrary, they stressed, people would think about their family and clan 
first. Secondly, they would think about their city and local areas. Thirdly, they would think 
about their reception and only fourthly would they think about Somaliland. We need to 
stress however, that as the demonstration grew bigger and bigger during the day, the 
frustrations, insecurities and potential conflicts were gradually replaced by a heightened 
sense of actually forming a united and thriving national community.  
 
These early demonstrators expressed viewpoints that compromise the public ideology of 
Somaliland and the claims to independence. Our point is precisely that the more difficult it 
is to realise Somaliland as a functioning political project, the louder the agitators will be 
shouting in Parliament Square. In this sense Somaliland and ‘the Somaliland community’ 
need to be seen in relation to the challenges they face. The more ambiguous and liminal it 
appears, the stronger the solidarity and the more manifest the national rhetoric. The point is 
that behind the immediate harmony of the demonstration and the coherence of the 
arguments for recognition, the demonstration displayed disharmony and liminality. For 
example the disharmony related to two different bases of social organisation: clan and 
nation. National ideology informs us that Somaliland is a nation based in its own history and 
culture. In this sense Somaliland is portrayed as a nation that has moved ahead of Somalia 
and its own past in its defiance of clan as the base of social organisation. However, 
everyone only vaguely familiar with social realities in Somaliland and among Somalis and 
Somalilanders in the West knows that relations between kin, often referred to by westerners 
and English-speaking Somalis as a clan, are extremely important. The ambivalence between 
nation and clan and how to fuse social realities with ideologies of nation and state is not 
only a problem as such but in a more subtle way also a creative tension having the potential 
of generating heightened solidarities and new identities.  
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These challenges and ambivalences were also seen in the fact that not all “potential 
Somalilanders” in London had showed up for the demonstration nor found it a particular 
good idea to pursue the road that perhaps will lead to independence. On the days preceding 
the demonstration, several Somalis that potentially could claim their Somaliland citizenship, 
did not wish to join the demonstration because they did not support Somaliland but on the 
contrary supported the reinstallation of the Somali Republic. One person, who grew up 
within the boundaries claimed by Somaliland and who, according to the Somaliland 
constitution, is a possible Somaliland citizen, had committed an act of effective symbolic 
violence to one of the above-mentioned invitations hanging on the wall in a café in Southall. 
He had cut the invitation designed as the Somaliland flag into pieces because he did not 
support Somaliland and in no way wished to take part in the demonstration. This “potential 
Somalilander” was not alone in his rejection of Somaliland but on the contrary expressed a 
position taken by several Somalilanders whom we met before the demonstration. The fact 
that many people from the geographical area known as Somaliland, and genealogically 
qualifying for Somaliland citizenship are not supporters of Somaliland, is highly sensitive 
and surrounded by a certain degree of taboo. This was also seen from the reactions from the 
Somaliland participants at Portcullis House when the Somali-American professor took the 
floor during the discussion and presented himself as coming from the North but not seeing 
himself as a Somalilander thereby trespassing the unwritten boundary of what can be 
expressed in a public forum celebrating the existence of Somaliland.  
 
Cultural notions and practices of community, belonging and solidarity were also being 
challenged. In London, as in Copenhagen, many Somalilanders and Somalis express how 
they feel about the fact that the values and practices characterising their community are 
disintegrating and challenged by a western foreign culture. Often people have explained to 
us that the community is falling apart and that people are just living like individuals. The 
ideology of solidarity is very manifest and relates to a nomadic history and tradition among 
Somalis. Often it has been explained to us that if a nomadic family in need of water or food 
for themselves or their livestock encounters another family in the nomadic area they will be 
helped in the best way possible. According to this ideology, Somalis will always help each 
other and no one can refuse to help another Somali if their help is really needed. In London, 
the importance and significance of family networks are changed and partly replaced by the 
welfare system. One informant explained that in London people are saying goodbye to their 
clans and joining the welfare community instead. The notion of “leaving your clan” or 
“community of relations” and joining an abstract “welfare community” is seen as a threat to 
“the Somali culture and community”. Especially to many Somali men living in the west, the 
welfare system is seen as threatening their position within more traditional Somali family 
values and practices and thereby Somali values in more general. In sum, the fact that 
notions of “community” and “solidarity” are challenged in the West, is an important context 
for the understanding of the demonstration where people at least for a day formed “a 
community”.  
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Conclusion  
The demonstration and the other events unfolding in London point towards a transborder 
Somaliland citizenry united in its ambitions and orientations towards finding a space for 
Somaliland within the world of sovereign nation states. “The Somaliland diaspora” appears 
homogeneous, as it stands shoulder to shoulder united through shared symbols of flags, 
songs, slogans, colonial histories, memories of civil war and oppression. A closer 
examination, however, reveals the tensions, disagreements and heterogeneity within “the 
diaspora” or “transborder citizenry” and thereby points to the weakness of these analytical 
concepts of often highlighting the shared histories, horizons and agendas and neglecting the 
rifts and cracks behind a public homogenous image. Underneath the image of homogeneity, 
there appears to be a wealth of “dangerous” liminal identities not yet certain of what to be, 
where to go, whom or what to support and how and when to do so. Through detailed 
ethnographic fieldworks and a sensitive political, cultural and historical contextualisation of 
the production of a Somaliland political ideology, we have shown how uncertainty and 
divergent views have a both threatening and creative force “within diasporas”.  
 
Moreover, our paper shows the importance of history in arguments for self-determination 
and how history is not a social fact but the outcome of ongoing arguments and struggles 
between different actors and institutions. Our study testifies to the important role played by 
“the diaspora” in the making of history and in presenting the arguments for the recognition 
of Somaliland. Somalilanders in the UK have not only participated in the construction of a 
national history and arguments for political self determination, but have also worked to 
facilitate, create and locate a social and political stage, where these arguments can be 
presented most powerfully. In this sense Somalilanders living “in diaspora” have played 
important roles in “spreading the message of Somaliland” to an international audience. This 
shows how “the diaspora” has been very important for the ideological and physical 
construction of a homeland and not primarily the other way round, as has been observed in 
other similar situations. In the case of Haiti, for example, the Haitian diaspora was named 
the “Tenth Department” by General Aristide when he was inaugurated as president, thereby 
actively creating “a community of Haitians” living outside the Haitian nation state. In this 
way Aristide changed the location of diaspora from a location of exile into an integral and 
vital part of Haiti (Schiller and Fouron 2001: 120-121). In the case of Somaliland, there are 
still many opportunities for actively creating and incorporating “the Somaliland diaspora” 
into the affairs of the Somaliland nation state. Also our study has shown that more than 
describing specific persons and a geographical location, “the Somaliland diaspora” appears 
to be a social and political position of giving, resourcefulness and agency that can be 
claimed, wished for and aspired to by different persons in a variety of situations. The 
complexity of the significance of “diaspora” is highlighted in the fact that the word or 
notion of “diaspora” did not play a significant role during the demonstration in Parliament 
Square as this gathering of people was for all Somalilanders. During the debate at Portcullis 
House and at the Landmark Hotel, however, there were several references to “the 
Somaliland diaspora” and its importance to Somaliland. This testifies to the elitist 
connotations associated with the term “diaspora”.  
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Our analysis is based on one specific event and in doing so we go against a strong tradition 
within anthropology to filter out the freak occurrence, the anomaly, the unrepresentative 
figure, the non-repetitive pattern, and the impermanent and unnoticed cultural form in the 
finished ethnography. Anthropology has traditionally been concerned with analysing the 
patterns of culture, the principles of social organization, customs, and traditions, systems of 
rules and phenomena that are understood to have withstood the test of time (Malkki 1997: 
89-90). The events unfolding in London were unique and transitory, but there can be no 
doubt that they will not be weak or fleeting in their effects. An interesting path to follow, 
and a way of extending this case study, would be to follow the intense discussions taking 
place online where the events in London are being retold, contested and defended by 
numerous Somalis and Somalilanders around the world. As such the events in London have 
shaped or influenced notions of being “a Somalilander”, “a Somali”, of “living in the UK”, 
“in the diaspora”, of “returning to Somaliland” or in other ways engaging oneself in a 
transnational political struggle.  
 
Finally, we would like to repeat that our paper is not an intervention in favour of the 
political legacy of either Somaliland or a united Somalia, but aims at contributing to a better 
understanding of the meanings and practices relating to “the Somaliland diaspora”. 
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